【题目】Crowding in School Choice                             

【主讲人】周愚副教授(日本京都大学，经济学研究科)

【主持人】周匀月博士         

【时间】6月23日（周四）下午1:00

【地点】 腾讯会议794-844-594（会议密码内部通知，参会人员请输入“实名+单位”进入会场，会场谢绝一切广告信息！）

【主讲人简介】周愚，副教授（青年）日本京都大学经济学研究科，主要研究方向为微观经济学，博弈论以及市场设计。美国数学学会《数学评论》评论员，主要论文发表在在Games and Economic Behaviors，Inter national Economic Review以及经济研究等杂志上。目前完成并主持日本国家级课题3项（青年项目），作为子课题负责人承担日本国家级重大课题3项。

【摘要】We consider the market design problem of matching students to schools in the presence of crowding effects. These effects are salient in parents' decision making and the empirical literature; however, they cause major difficulties in the design of satisfactory mechanisms and, as such, are not currently considered. We propose a new framework and an equilibrium notion that accommodates crowding, no-envy, and respect for priorities. The equilibrium has a student-optimal element that induces an incentive compatible mechanism and is implementable via a novel algorithm. Moreover, analogs of fundamental structural results of the matching literature---the Rural Hospitals Theorem, welfare lattice, etc.---survive.